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5. Private renting under rent control in Denmark
Hans Skifter Andersen, Danish Building Research Institute at Aalborg University. Email HSA@sbi.dk
1. Introduction
Like most other countries in Europe the Danish private rented sector has been in decline for many years. Before the Second World War it was the dominant sector but after the war social housing began to take over new rental house building. The real blow to private rented housing came in the last part of the1960s when higher inflation increased the value of tax deductions and made owner-occupied housing much more economic attractive. New, private rented housing did not receive direct production subsidies like social housing, which made it difficult to build housing at affor​dable rents and compete with social housing.

Moreover, the older stock decreased by about one third from the middle of the 1960s to the end of the1980s. Besides demolition of old and neglected buildings, the main reason was a conversion of dwellings to owner-occupied flats, which were made possible from 1966. This transfor​mation of tenure was, however, partly stopped in the 1970s and totally prohibited after 1980. Instead, were in the following years a great number of private lettings transformed into coopera​tives after an act was passed in parliament.  This act ordered landlords, who intended to sell their property, first to give an offer to sitting tenants, who wished to form a coopera​tive. 

This development of the private rental sector can be seen as a consequence of the low prestige this sector has been ascribed in Denmark. It has been seen as a problematic sector because of low co-determination of tenants on their own housing situation and because of potential conflicts between tenants and landlords. This is put into relief by the high degree of tenant involvement and co-determination in the social sector. As a consequence there has been no political and financial support for private renting. Moreover, the sector has been sustained in a strict rent control regulation which has not been changed much since World War II. 

In spite of this unfavourable situation for private renting the sector in Denmark has been able to attract professional property companies and other professional investors, who owns more than half of the stock.
2. Housing policy in context
Like the other Nordic countries Denmark can be characterised as a welfare state. There is wide theoretical and political agreement on the fact that a special Nordic Welfare Model exists and in many fundamental ways differs from other welfare models (Castles 2004). Some of the main features of the NWM are: 

- Comprehensiveness of social policy: encompassing social security, social and health care services, education, housing, employment etc.
- Strong state involvement and extensive public responsibility in different social policy areas.
- High degree of universalism: all pay and all benefit. 
- High level of social service provision: the notion of ‘public social services state’.
- Uniformity of service provision: middle and upper classes use same services as others.
- Municipalities responsible for providing services and partly also financing them.
- Benefits are largely tax financed.
- Strong political and popular support to the NWM and universalism in particular.

Denmark had a gross national income pr capita on 37.000 $ in 2008, which is one of the highest in the world. But a large part of the national income is used for government expenditures, which made up 58 per cent of GDP in 2009; the highest share among the OECD countries.

In spite of the relatively large public sector, housing is not something that is produced and distributed by the public sector. Basically housing is supplied by the private housing market, but the state (and local authorities) are also involved and supports and regulates the market to obtain certain goals for the provision of housing.

Bengtsson et. al. (2006) finds that there are some principal differences between the Nordic countries. The Danish and Swedish housing policies are characterised as more general and universalistic in the sense that they to a greater extent are pointed at housing for the whole population and not only for vulnerable low-income groups. This means that support for housing to a great extent also is available for middle and higher income groups, especially tax subsidies and social housing. 

Denmark has had strong social objectives for housing but not as pronounced as in Sweden (Hansen and Skifter Andersen 1993). More weight has been put on the market and less on state control, especially of housing finance. General tax subsidies, which have strengthened homeownership, have been extensive until the beginning of the 1990’s. But there has also been a considerable support for social housing and the sector is strong. Despite a general market orientation there is a strong rent control in the private rented market, which has been maintained from World War II until today.

The public sector in Denmark is much decentralised with very strong local authorities. Local governments are in charge of most of the public services and have a strong economy based on income and property taxation. Local authorities have the responsibility of providing shelter for homeless, for the elderly and for refugees. They control the construction of new social housing because they have to supply a certain economic support and make guaranties for mortgages, which they can deny. Moreover, they have to supervise the economy of local housing associations (described below). There is a tight cooperation between local authorities and housing associations on solving these tasks. 

In connection with private renting local authorities can decide on what kind of regulation should be applied in the municipality. 
3. Housing provision and policy 
Housing provision in Denmark 
Denmark has about 2.5 million dwellings corresponding to 460 dwellings per inhabitant. More than half of the dwellings have four or more rooms as can be seen from Table 1.  The average number of rooms per inhabitant is 1.7.




Table 1. Dwellings with separate kitchen distributed on number of rooms (%), number of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants and average rooms per person 2008 
 	Distribution of dwellings %
1 room 	4
2 rooms 	18
3 rooms 	23
4 rooms 	24
5+ rooms 	29
Not stated	2
Total	100
Number of dwellings/1000 inhabitants	462
Average rooms per inhabitant	1.7
Note: Kitchen and bathroom are not included
Source: The Nordic Statbank, Eurostat

The housing conditions are thus quite favourable in Denmark. In a survey made by Eurostat (Table 2) it was shown that only 8.3 per cent of that respondent households found that they lived in an overcrowded dwelling. More than 25 per cent found their dwellings very spacious. 

Table 2 Households distributed on overcrowded and spacious dwellings 2008 (%)
 	Over-crowded	Somewhat spacious 	Very spacious 	Total	n 
Denmark 	8.3 	66.5 	25.2 	100	5 711 
Source: Eurostat (EU-SILC)

Nearby 60 per cent of the dwellings are in detached or semi detached single family houses (Table 3)

Table 3 Dwellings distributed on type of building 2008 (%)
 	Denmark 
One- and two family houses	59
Apartment blocks	38
Other dwellings	3
Total	100
Source: The Nordic Statbank

The Danish housing market
The composition of the housing market is seen in Table 4. 

Table 4 Dwellings distributed on tenures in Denmark 2008
	Denmark 
Owner-occupied houses	48%
Owner-occupied flats etc.	5%
Co-operatives	7%
Private renting	19%
Social/public housing	21%
All	100%
Source: Denmark Statistics

Compared to many other countries the share of owner-occupied dwellings is quite low. The rented sector is about 40 per cent and divided into two sectors of nearby equal size as social housing and private rented housing. Finally there is a relatively small co-operative sector.

Developments on the housing market
The tenure composition of the housing market has changed somewhat over time. In 1970 47 per cent of the dwellings were owner-occupied. The private rented sector were much larger with 34 per cent, while social housing had nearby the same share (19 per cent). There were very few co-operatives.

The construction activity has been very fluctuating during the last 30 years due to the general economic development in the country. The ups and downs in the economy in the 198ties resulted in a considerable drop in house building, especially concerning private detached and semidetached homes. The social sector was kept alive by increased public support. The fluctuations have been even larger after 2000. First a rapid increase and then an outrageous decrease after 2007. It is not possible to identify private renting in the group of private build dwellings, but it is expected that only a few has been build, especially after 2007.



Figure 1 Construction of dwellings in Denmark 181-2011.

The very unquiet development of the housing market in Denmark is also mirrored in the development of house prices.


Figure 2 The development in fixed prices for detached (and semidetached homes) and for owner-occupied flats in Denmark (Index, 1992 = 100)

The prices hit the bottom in 1993 after the recession in the 1980ties. From 1992 to 2007 prices in fixed values increased 2.5 times for detached homes and 3 times for owner-occupied flats. As the figure shows prices fell about 20 per cent from 2007 to 2010. The lates figures show that they are still falling in 2012.

Housing policy in Denmark
Housing policy can be defined as public initiatives which affect the supply, price and quality of dwellings plus how they are distributed between households. Housing policy instruments can be divided into:

1.	Individual financial support for housing consumption among households: housing allowances given for individual households dependent on their needs, incomes and housing costs
2.	Direct financial supply support: Subsidies for construction of new housing or to reduce running costs in certain tenures
3.	Establishment of a special social housing sector: Establishment of a housing sector that is owned or highly controlled by central or local governments with the aim to provide cheaper or better dwellings for certain parts of the population
4.	Indirect tax support: Tax systems that have importance for housing costs and make housing investments more profitable than other investments 
5.	Rent/price control: Regulation resulting in that rents or prices are below the local market level
6.	Regulation of the access to dwellings:  Rules determining which households get access to vacant dwellings
7.	Institutions and rules for finance of dwellings: Institutions providing loans with lower interest or with reduced requirements for creditworthiness

Housing policy is split up into measures for different housing tenures. The Danish housing policy can be characterised as shown in Table 5.

Table 5 Characterisation of the Danish housing policy
 	Social housing	Private renting	Co-operatives etc	Owner-occupied
Individual support	yes	yes	(yes)	no
Supply support	yes	no	no	no
Tax support	no	no	(yes)	yes
Rent/price control?	yes	yes	(yes)	no
Regulation of access?	yes	no	(yes)	no
Supported finance	yes	no	(yes)	no
(yes) means partly

Owner-occupied housing
In Denmark housing finance has been privatised since the early 1960s. For many years special so-called 'real credit associations' had monopoly on providing mortgages with security in real estate. In recent years these associations have been privatised and sold to banks or have become normal joint-stock companies. And banks have also been given the permission to give loans. Earlier the only condition for loans was the value of the property and the loan could be up to 80 percent of the estimated value. After the fiscal crisis in the last part of the 1980s, however, personal economic capabilities of the debtor came increasingly in focus, especially after the financial crisis in 2008. So the evaluation of the financial situation and solidity of the potential borrower, made by the banks, increasingly determines who can get loans for buying a home.

There are no supported loans and no supply or individual subsidies for owner-occupation in Denmark (except for some tax advantages for pensioners). Earlier general tax subsidies were very high because all capital costs could be deducted from the taxable income. This has been very much reduced since the beginning of the 1990s and now only about 30 per cent of the costs interest can be deducted. Moreover, owner-occupied housing is due to property value taxation, which is one per cent of the taxable value. Capital gains are not taxed.

Co-operatives
Co-operatives are a small sector in Denmark and most of it is older housing that has been transferred from private renting. This is because there has since 1981 been legislation saying that, when a private landlord wants to sell his property, he has to offer it to the tenants as a co-operative at the same price as the offer he gets from other potential buyers. Especially in the City of Copenhagen co-operatives have expanded and is now the largest tenure with about 25 per cent of dwellings. 

Since the beginning of the 1980s there has, however, been public financial support for building of new co-operatives with certain limits on the size and costs of the dwellings. This support has since 2000 been reduced to a public guarantee on loans.

There are no supply subsidies for the older co-operatives and there is no individual support, except for pensioners, in co-operatives as a whole. Capital costs on individual loans to finance the share contribution can be deducted in the taxable income, but loans taken by the co-operative can not.

The prices of co-operatives are subject to regulation. In principle the share value of a dwelling should be calculated based on the difference between the taxable value of the property and the mortgages on it. The taxable value of co-operatives is calculated as the value of a comparable rented property. Because of rent control these values have been rather low which for a long period resulted in that a co-operative was much cheaper to buy and live in than owner-occupied flats. This resulted in queues and most co-operatives had waiting lists with different rules, which had been decided locally. As a result co-operatives to a large extent have been populated with people being in family with each other or being friends. To some extents co-operatives have been a closed sector for outsiders, especially immigrants, who do not have personal relations to the residents living there.

In recent years this situation to some extent has been changed. It has been allowed that co-operatives get a specific evaluation of the value of the property by a real estate agent as basis for calculation of the share value. As prices on rental property has skyrocketed and the agents been happy to make a high value, share prices in some properties has increased to what can be seen as a market value comparable with owner-occupied flats. Co-operative dwellings are increasingly sold on the market and not distributed by waiting lists. But it is very difficult for house hunters to see through the economic conditions of co-operatives and some people have burned themselves by buying a too expensive dwelling.

Parts of the co-operative sector are still relatively cheap, but the access to these dwellings is more than ever conditioned by social relations to the present residents. An increasingly part is purchased free at market price level, but as legislation has become obsolete this involves some financial risks.

Social housing
In Denmark social housing is organised as non-profit housing associations. In principle the associations are private autonomous organisations but they are subject to a strict public regulation and under the surveillance of local authorities.

Rents in social housing are fixed in accordance with principles of financial balance between earnings and expenses of each housing estate. As the historic costs and capital costs vary between estates build in different time periods this means that rents varies in a way that is not in accordance with the variation in quality and location. Some estates are very cheap and some are very expensive. These differences are to some extent levelled out because especially older estates are paying contribution to a central fuond called 'Landsbyggefonden'. This fund has been established to collect money for renewal of social housing. The system is that tenants in older housing contimues to pay the same rent when the mortgages on their estate expires and a sum similar to the earlier mortgage payments is every month transferred to the central fund. But in general the system of financial balance within each estate causes that some estates have difficulties in competing on the housing market and are vulnerable to distress and depravation.

New social housing is subsidised and under controlled costs. The local authorities are obliged to contribute with 14 per cent of the funding. Two percent comes from contributions from the tenants and 84 per cent comes from the private real credit institutes at market conditions. Earlier, when interests in Denmark were higher, there was a support bringing down capital costs to a certain interest level, about 3.4 per cent. Tenants in social housing can get housing allowances with the same rules as for private renting. Tenants can also get guaranteed loans to cover the deposit.

In principle all kinds of households can get access to social housing. On some estates with larger dwellings there can be principles about giving preference to families with children but this priority can be cancelled if dwellings are vacant. As a main rule vacant dwellings on an estate are allocated to people on a waiting list in the specific housing association. But there are also several other means of allocation. One is that the local authorities can dispose of 25 per cent of vacant dwellings. These are often used for poor families in urgent need of a dwelling and for refugees. Another system is an internal waiting list in the association where residents, who can move out and release a dwelling, are given preference. Finally there, in connection with urban policies trying to change the social composition of deprived neighbourhoods, have been introduced other allocation systems giving preference to people in education or employment.

Especially in Copenhagen there has been a high pressure on the social housing sector and the normal waiting lists have been very long resulting in many years of waiting time. 
4. Private renting today 
The dwellings
The majority of private rented dwellings are located in multi-unit buildings with 3 or more dwellings.
Table 6 Private rented dwellings in Denmark distributed on property type and size 2004.
 	Number of dwellings	Per cent
Without kitchen	25.225	6
Rented, but with status as owner-occupied	145.345	32
Other properties with one dwelling	5.615	1
Properties with 2 dwellings	29.850	7
Properties with 3-5 dwellings 	47.270	11
Properties with 6-10 dwellings	55.015	12
Properties with 11-20 dwellings	42.650	9
Properties with  >20 dwellings 	99.695	22
Unknown	1.350	0,3
Total	452.015	100
Source: Skifter Andersen 2007b

Six percent of the dwellings are without kitchen, some of which are in student hostels etc. One third is homes or flats that are build as could be sold as owner-occupied housing, but for different reasons are let out. Only 245.000 dwellings are located in properties with three or more dwellings, corresponding to 54 per cent of private renting and about ten per cent of the total stock. Two out of three are constructed before 1940 and 13 per cent lack some kind of facilities like bathroom or modern heating. 
Table 7. Private rented dwellings distributed on size (square meters) compared to the total housing stock 2004
	Private renting	All housing
Dwelling size		
- 49 m2	15%	16%
50-79 m2	41%	18%
80-109 m2	25%	26%
110 - m2	18%	40%
I alt	100%	100%
Source: Skifter Andersen 2007b

The average size of private rented dwellings is 76 sq. meters and more than half of the dwellings have below 80 sq. meter as can be seen from Table 7, while only 34 per cent of the total stock is below 80 sq. meter. 55 per cent of the dwellings were constructed before WW2 and only 15 per cent after 1980. Private renting in Denmark contains thus some of the oldest and smallest dwellings in the country with the lowest quality.

The residents
As can be seen from Table 8 residents in private renting in Denmark comes from different social groups. But the composition deviates somewhat from the national average and from other tenures.




Table 8. Residents in private renting (households) distributed on social groups compared to the distribution in other tenures. Calculated over-representation of groups in tenures 2004.
 	Private renting	Social housing	Co-operatives 	Owner-occupied flats	Owner-occupied single family	All
Old age pensioners	22%	29%	26%	18%	22%	24%
Others without work	16%	26%	11%	6%	4%	12%
Students	15%	7%	10%	6%	1%	6%
Employed with low incomes	26%	21%	26%	32%	12%	19%
Employed middle-higher inc.	19%	16%	25%	36%	59%	39%
All	98%	99%	98%	98%	98%	100%
Overrepresentation						
Old age pensioners	-8	21	8	-25	-8	
Others without work	33	117	-8	-50	-67	
Students	150	17	67	0	-83	
Employed with lower incomes	37	11	37	68	-37	
Employed middle-higher inc.	-51	-59	-36	-8	51	 
Note: Over-representation of a group is the relative difference between the proportion in the tenure and the whole population in per cent.
Source: Skifter Andersen 2007b

Private renting has an over representation of people without work, but far from so pronounced as in the social housing sector. Employed people with lower incomes are also over represented and resembles in this aspect the co-operatives-operatives and owner-occupied flats. The most over represented group is, however, students, who make up 15 per cent of the residents. This especially applies to private renting in the bigger cities with universities. This is a result of a gradual change over the years where elderly, who earlier made up an important part of residents smaller dwellings in the cities, have died out and been replaced by students.
5. Subsidies, regulation and taxation
Private renting in Denmark is a somewhat diverse sector where different parts of it are subject to different kinds of regulation.

Tenants in private renting can get housing allowances. There are two kinds of allowances for respectively pensioners and other tenants, where the allowance for pensioners is much more favourable. The size of the subsidy is dependent on the size of the rent, the size of the dwelling, household income and household size.

There are no supply subsidies or supported/guaranteed loans available for new private rented dwellings. This entails that private renting is the only tenure in Denmark, which do not receive any support from the public. For a short time in the 1980ties there were some special tax incentives for pension funds.

Profits from the running of private rental properties are taxed as usual business net income, which appears after deduction of all kinds of expences. Moreover, capital gains are taxed by up to 40 per cent. This is a special condition as there are no capital gains taxes on owner-occupied dwellings.

Compared to the subsidization and taxation of other tenures the Danish housing policy has disfavoured private renting. The consequence is that new private renting cannot compete with other tenures on the housing market and because of that rent control results in rents below market levels in older private renting, they  new private renting is are much more expensive than older private renting. A comparison of housing costs in new  housing in 2006 (Socialministeriet 2006) thus showed that because of subsidies in the other tenures a new private rented dwelling had five per cent higher running costs than a similarn owner-occupied dwelling, 10 per cent higher than social housing and 18 per cent higher than a co-operative dwelling. As a consequence of this very little new private renting has been constructed; mostly as luxury apartments by the harbour side in Copenhagen.

Regulation of private renting
Danish tenants have a high degree of security and it is difficult for landlords to give tenants notice to quit in housing with status as private rented. The only accepted reasons for a notice are either rent arrears or that the landlord himself wishes to reside in the dwelling. Only in dwellings with status build as or transferred to owner-occupationied (detached houses and owner-occupied flats) it is possible to make time limited contracts.

Denmark still has a strict rent control in up to 200.000 lettings in private properties. It is used in properties with more than 5 dwellings built before 1991 in municipalities where the local authorities have decided to impose rent control.

Since 1976 rents in Danish private rented housing have been regulated according to a principle called "rent determined by expenditures". Certain rules are laid down by legislation as how to calculate the rent in every estate. The rent is determined by adding up the budgeted running costs such as cleaning, taxes, insurances etc. plus a certain amount per dwelling for ad​ministration. Further fixed transferences per square meter for maintenance are included, and there is a fixed so‑called capital yield to the landlord, which has been of the same size since 1976. This capital yield has not changed in all those years and is far from covering usual capital costs which cannot be included in the rent setting.

Rents can be raised at any time, but the landlord has to inform the tenants in advance and to provide them with written proof that the new rent is justified by higher expenses. 
Furthermore, it is possible to raise the rent in connection with improve​ments. The allowed increase is, in prin​ciple, within certain limits, calculated on the basis of the repayments and interests on the loans necessary to finance the improvement and on the calculated interests on capital contributed by the landlord himself. In case of disagreement over the budget and rent increase the tenants can complain to a board of appeal, called the rent tribunal, which can settle the dispute.

The result of rent control is that rents tend to be below the market level. Estimated figures from 2008 (Skifter Andersen, Turner and Søholt 2012) show an actual rent level of 8.59 Euro per square meter per month. It is a only a little more than rents in the social housing sector (7.85). In an earlier government report (Lejelovskommisionen 1997) it was estimated that rents were about 40 per cent below the market level. In a more recent study (Skifter Andersen and Skak 2008) it was reported that private landlords in average only expected a 10 per cent increase in rents if rent control were abolished. But in the big cities rents are more below market level than in less urbanised areas. In Greater Copenhagen the rents are only 12 per cent higher than the average for the country, which is much lesser than should be expected. It is thus most often in the Capital and other bigger cities that rents are somewhat below market levels.

As a consequence there is a surplus demand for private renting, especially in the cities. This means that landlords often can pick and choose between the applicants for dwellings. Less than half of new tenants are found through advertisement (Skifter Andersen and Skak 2008). More than 20 per cent of landlords emphasise to pick tenants who they know in advance. Moreover, the study shows that landlords often have distinct opinions on, who they do not want to let to. For example 60 per cent of landlords do not want to let out to families with social problems and 18 per cent do not want immigrants.

When a landlord wants to sell a property he is obliged to offer it to the tenants as a co-operative. He can do this as a starting point and since the above mentioned increase in prices for co-operatives some landlords have seen this as a way to obtain higher sales prices. Otherwise, the procedure is that when the landlord has got an agreement with piotential buyer on the price, he must return to the tenants and offer them the property at that price. Then the tenants have to accept or refuse the offer within some weeks. These rules have prompted a mayor transfer of private renting to co-operatives, especially in the municipality of Copenhagen where co-operatives now is the largest tenure.

A loophole in rent control
To promote investments in renewal of private renting the Danish government ten years ago made an addition to the legislation on private renting. The new paragraph implied that private landlords can change the rent control from the strong control to the softer one if they invest a certain amount of money per square meter in a vacant dwelling. The ‘soft’ control means that it is possible for tenants to complain about the rents to a rent control board if they find that the rent is far about local rent levels, but in reality this is seldom used. But it is only possible to do this in vacant lettings. 

It has been calculated (Skifter Andersen and Skak 2008) that about 28 per cent of lettings under strict rent control in this way has been transferred to the soft control with rents closer to market level. This has, especially in Copenhagen, had an marked effect on rents. 

It can be expected that this loophole in the cause of time will diminish the effect of the strong rent control. Especially professional landlords in the cities use this possibility systematically to transfer dwellings to a higher quality level and obtain higher rents.
6. Investment, ownership and management
Who are the private landlords?
A newer study on the private rented sector in Denmark was conducted in 2007 (Skifter Andersen and Skak 2008). It was based on data from a survey among 385 private landlords with properties containing three or more dwellings and on data from public registers on all private landlords and properties with private renting. In the survey landlords were asked about motives for buying and selling property and factors that influence such decisions, strategies for letting and running properties, and data about rents and expenses and economic returns.

The respondents in the survey were asked to characterize themselves as landlords by choosing among eight possibilities shown in Table 9. The table shows all landlords in the weighted population distributed on kinds of landlords. Moreover, the share of properties and dwellings owned by the different kinds of landlords is shown; the average number of dwellings owned by each and the average year when they bought their first property.


 

Table 9 Different kinds of landlords having at least one property with three or more dwellings distributed on their share of landlords of properties and dwellings 2007.
	Share of all landlords %	Share of properties	Share of dwellings	Properties per landlord	Dwellings per landlord	Dwellings per property	Average year first property was bought	Number of respondents
Private individuals landlordism as main business 	11	19	15	16	131	8	1985	45
Private individuals landlordism sideline business	40	14	8	3	18	6	1990	149
Property companies landlordism main business	24	33	38	12	154	13	1989	93
Property companies mainly commercial lettings 	1,9	1	1	3	39	14	1979	10
Companies other business as main occupation	7,9	5	3	6	43	7	1993	29
Independent non-profit institutions	7,3	6	10	8	130	17	1930	29
Pensions funds, banks or insurance companies*)	1,7	10	18	53	2019	38	1974	6
Building companies *)	0,4	0	0	2	8	5	1999	2
Other	5,3	12	8	20	143	7	1967	19
All landlords	100	100	100	9	115	13	1983	382
*) These figures are somewhat unreliable due to the small number of respondents
Source: Skifter Andersen and Skak 2008

Professional landlords with landlordism as main business – either individuals or property companies – own more than 50 per cent of dwellings. Moreover financial institutions (pension funds, banks or insurance companies) are calculated to have 18 per cent, but the figures are not quite reliable because of the small number of respondents. It is typical for professional landlords that every landlord has many properties and dwellings and that the properties owned are relatively large. This is especially common among the – few – financial institutions. Compared to an earlier study made in the middle of the 1990ties (Skifter Andersen 1998) there is an indication of that the proportion of the stock owned by professionals has increased somewhat. But as the stock has decreased in the same period the number of dwellings owned by professionals could not have increased much.

The independent non-profit institutions own about 10 per cent of dwellings. These are organisations who have not purchased their properties for economic reasons but because they wanted to provide housing for specific groups as members of trade unions. Their properties are larger than average and they have been in the business for many years. On average their first property was bought in 1930, which means that many of them have a history dating back to the 1920s. 

Sideline investors can be both individuals and companies either with other business or with commercial properties as the main business. Private individuals with private renting as a sideline business constitute more than half of the owners, but only possess 14 per cent of dwellings. Companies own about 5 per cent of the dwellings. It is typical for all sideline investors that they only have a few, and smaller, properties.

Motives for Buying Properties
Most immobiles in Denmark are financed by special Danish mortgage credit institutions. The loans have, until the financial crisis in 2008, been quite easy to get and the interests are low.
The landlords were asked about their original motives for buying their properties. They could choose between nine possible answers divided into ‘user motives’ and ‘economic motives’.


Table 10 Motives for the acquisition of properties. Percentage of landlords stating motive as most important and as one of three most important motives.
	Most important motive 	Among three most important motives*)
User motives 		
Wanted to live in the property	8	13
Housing for children or family	3	9
Housing for employee	1	3
Housing for specific groups	7	10
Use property for own commercial activities	1	1
Inherited the property or got it by accident	8	9
Economic motives		
Business with building activities	5	10
Letting out as a source of income	31	47
Investment 	32	62
Other	1	3
No answer	3	
All	100	165
All user motives	20	32
*) Percentages do not add to 100 as multiple responses were possible
Source: Skifter Andersen and Skak 2008

Economic motives for buying rental properties are clearly the most common. To obtain business and running income by letting out is the most important motive for one third of the landlords. Moreover, acquisition of rental properties as an investment is the most important motive for another one third. 

It can, however, also be seen that motives connected to the use of properties are important. In total, 20 per cent of landlords had as their main motive for buying properties to live or to have business premises in the property or to use the dwellings for family, employees or special groups. One third of all landlords had this as one of the three most important motives.

Eight per cent became landlords by accident because they inherited a property or acquired it for other reasons. Moreover, five per cent bought properties to obtain business with building activities and this was one of the three most important motives for ten per cent. 

There are, however, marked differences between motives for having properties among different kinds of landlords. It is, as could be expected, especially sideline investors and independent institutions that have bought their properties because they wanted to use it for different purposes or because they got it by accident. Also some of the pension funds have a motive to get accommodation for members. For professional landlords – especially individuals – the main motive is to obtain a source of income. It is mostly professional companies that see their properties as investments but also a relative high share (37 per cent) of the individual sideline investors considers their properties as an investment. 

Landlord classification
Based on the information on different kinds of landlords and their motives for having rental properties a new more simple classification of landlords has been worked out. The following types of landlords were defined: 

1. 	Business landlords: Landlords (individuals or companies) letting out as their main business plus institutional investors. (own 62 per cent of properties and 75 per cent of the dwellings in properties with three or more dwellings)
2. 	Sideline investors: Landlords who bought their properties for investment purposes, but do not have it as their main business (respectively 29 and 15 percent)
3. 	Property users: Landlords who acquired their properties because they wanted to use them by themselves or make them available for family or employees (two and one percent)
4. 	Non-profit landlords: Independent institutions with the purpose of providing housing for specific groups (seven and nine percent)

Strategies for Running Residential Property
In the survey nine different strategies were presented for respondents and they were asked to prioritize their importance for them. They were:

1. Economic surplus every year in every property
2. Yearly surplus for all properties as a whole
3. Long-term economic return
4. Short-time capital gains
5. Increase of property values by renovation
6. Increase of rental incomes by renovation
7. To keep the property clean and tidy
8. To satisfy tenants
9. To avoid conflicts with tenants.

The two first strategies are connected to landlords for whom short-term economic motives and the properties as a source of running income are important. It is of greatest importance in the first strategy. The third strategy is typical for investors with long-term economic motives. The fourth and fifth strategies are expected to belong to investors with speculative economic motives. The seventh strategy could be followed by landlords with, what could be called ‘property motives’, where the property is seen as a personal possession, but could also be seen in connection with the two last strategies: to satisfy or avoid conflicts with tenants. These strategies are expected to be connected to ‘service motives’. It is shown that there are significant differences in the strategies followed by different kinds of landlords (Skifter Andersen 2007b).

The most frequently mentioned strategy is to have an economic surplus every year from each or from all properties. This is the most important strategy for 50 per cent of all landlords and 67 per cent have this as one of the three most important strategies (Skifter Andersen and Skak 2008). As expected it is most important for sideline investors, who cannot afford to have a deficit, but it also has importance for half of all business landlords. It is of least importance as the most important strategy for non-profit institutions and property users, but is often among the three most important strategies for property users. The long-term economic return is not an important strategy for most landlords. It is the first strategy for only 15 per cent and one out of the three most important strategies for only one third of all landlords. It is most commonly found among business landlords, and is also most important for 18 per cent of sideline investors and for 30 per cent it is mentioned as one of the three most important motives. But 60 per cent of business landlords and 70 per cent of sideline investors do not have long term economic return as one of the three most important strategies. It is even less important for users and nearly without importance for non-profit landlords. As shown earlier there are, however, large differences between landlords considering the number of properties and dwellings they let out. The analysis above therefore does not give the right impression of how common the different strategies are used in the private rented sector in Denmark. More than half of all dwellings are owned by landlords whose primary strategy it is to achieve a good long term economic return.

It must be expected that long run capital gains has been an important part of the expected long term return for many landlords up to 2008 where property prices were increasing. Short time, more speculative, gains only is the most important strategy for a very small group of landlords, mostly ‘user landlords’. But it is among the three most important motives for 16 per cent, mostly for business landlords (18 per cent).

To gain economic return by renovating properties is seldom the most important strategy, but it has some importance as about one third of landlords mention it as one of the three most important strategies. It is especially business landlords that want to do this, but also sideline investors sometimes focus on renovation of their properties. While business landlords often want to increase rental incomes, the other types of owners mostly are interested in increasing property values. A possible explanation of this is that business landlords more often use renovation to get rid of the strict rent control. 

For independent institutions keeping the property clean and tidy and satisfying tenants needs were often the most important strategies. Also property users are – as could be expected – very concerned with these issues. It also has some importance for business landlords. Sideline investors are least concerned about the appearance of the property, but often with the satisfaction of tenants.

In average one out of four landlords, owing 37 per cent of dwellings, has used managing agents to manage their properties. This has some influence on the strategies. These landlords are more seldom interested in short time capital gains and more in long term returns.

Incomes and Returns on Investments in Private Renting
In the Danish study (Skifter Andersen and Skak 2008), information has been collected on incomes and expenditures in private rented properties and on expected sales values and increases in prices during the last five years.

The average gross income from the properties was about 800DKK per square meter (gross area measure) per year in 2005 corresponding to about 120 Euro per net square meter. Incomes, however, vary much between the more and less urbanized parts of the country. 

There is a marked difference in the economics of properties owned by different types of landlords also when taken into account that differences exist in the location of the properties owned by these types of landlords. Business landlords have a much higher gross income from the properties than sideline investors and even more than the ‘users’ get. Non-profit landlords have incomes at the same level as business landlords. These differences in incomes can to some extent be explained by the different quality of the properties. 

More surprising large differences in expenses are defrayed by different types of landlords. The non-profit landlords have very high expenditures. This perhaps can be explained by the high service these landlords tend to supply. Users and sideline investors have low expenses, which to some extent could be explained by having small properties and by doing administrative work themselves. The rules for Danish rent control could be a reason why business landlords have higher expenses for administration because they automatically get all these expenses paid by the tenants and therefore have no incitements to reduce them. The expenses for maintenance are even more varying between types of landlords. Business landlords are using much more money on maintenance than other landlords, but only in the more urbanized parts of the country where demand for rented housing is much stronger. One explanation for low expenses among sideline investors and users could be that some of them make maintenance as do-it-yourself work or as undeclared work.

As a result of lower expenses, sideline investors receive almost the same economic surplus per square meter as business landlords – especially in towns and rural areas. Users and non-profit landlords get (on average) a lower surplus.

Returns on investments
Based on data from the Danish study (Skifter Andersen and Skak 2008, Skifter Andersen 2007b) the average gross and net yields have been calculated as the economic gross and net surplus divided by the estimated sales value. Moreover, based on data on an estimated yearly increase in sales values, the total return has been calculated as the sum of the net yield and a relative increase in property value in fixed prices (Table 11).

Table 11. Calculated gross and net yields, average yearly increase in property value and total return, as a per cent of estimated sales values 2005.
	Gross yield	Net yield	Increase in property value	Total return	Estimated sales value (Euro/sq.m.)	Share of properties per cent
Cities and suburbs 						
Business Landlords	5,5	2,2	17	19,0	2.361	40
Sideline investors	5,7	3,1	9	12,3	1.439	18
Users	3,8	2,1	5	7,4	1.918	6
Non-profit	4,1	-0,4	7	6,2	2.946	3
All	5,1	2,1	13	15,2	2.227	66
Towns and rural areas						
Business Landlords	9,3	5,5	11	16,3	958	9
Sideline investors	12,0	7,7	6	13,7	702	19
Users	6,2	2,5	10	12,8	880	2
Non-profit	18,5	15,2	6	21,2	533	3
All	11,4	7,1	10	17,5	745	33

Sales values for properties owned by business and non-profit landlords are much higher than those of the sideline investors and users. It can be seen from Table 11 that the proportion between income and property value (gross yield) is almost the same for business and sideline investors. But it is considerably lower for users.

The calculated average net yield for all properties in the Danish private rented sector was quite small in 2005 – only 2.4 per cent of the estimated value. It can be compared to a market interest for bonds in Denmark at about 5–6 per cent at this time. Based on the landlords’ own estimation of the increase in the sales value of their property during the years 2001–2005 it can be calculated that there has been an average yearly increase in fixed sales prices at about 13 per cent. This leads to a total return on rental residential property at about 15 per cent in these years. 

Business landlords have experienced the highest relative increases in property values. This could be explained by their much higher expenses for improvements, some of which has been used to escape regulation, but perhaps also by their greater ability to invest in properties in locations with higher potentials for demand and increasing prices. Because of capital gains, business landlords have received the highest total profits at the same time as they have used more money to maintain and improve their properties. The other types of landlords have to some extent received their present economic surplus by leaving maintenance and improvements undone.
7. Recent trends 
Housing policy has for the last 12 years been a political taboo subject in Denmark. Since the election in 1998, which the right wing parties thought they lost because they proposed to abolish rent control, none of the political parties have dared to make changes in housing policies. The Ministry of Housing was abolished in 2001. This non-policy has also been extended to owner-occupied housing and co-operatives. However, as mentioned above, a small change was introduced in 2001 which permitted landlords to escape the strong rent control by investing a certain amount of money in vacant apartments. This change has, as described above in the section ‘a loophole in rent control’, proved to ease rent control for a considerable proportion of dwellings.
8. Boom, bust and the Great Recession
But the economic situation for private renting has changed much since the financial crisis appeared in 2008. Despite the low profits from the running of the estates capital gains made private renting a good investment until 2007.  Sales prices on private rental properties tripled in fixed prices from 2000 to 2008. 

The first reason is that property prices in Denmark in general soared before the crisis more than in other countries because the government reduced property taxes and allowed new loans with deferred instalments, which allowed people to pay higher prices for owner-occupied housing. Another reason could be that the use of investments in vacant dwellings to escape rent control (as described earlier) has resulted in higher property values. But perhaps most important is the possibility to transfer private rented properties to cooperatives. Prices on cooperative flats have increased very much in recent years in line with the general increase in property prices. This has increased the interest of tenants in buying their flat and increased the price that a landlord can get from the tenants if he/she wants to sell. This means that the development of capital values in the private rented sector to some extent is a result of increasing prices on cooperatives. 

From 2008 to 2011 sales prices fell 25 per cent in fixed prices for properties with more than nine lettings. Even if the stock market also has gone down, investments in private renting has been very unfavourable since 2008. Moreover, a new competition to traditional landlords has appeared from vacant owner-occupied dwellings which are offered as rented dwellings. The financial crisis and the price reductions in all kind of property have made banks and credit much more cautious and made it difficult for landlords and new homeowners to get mortgages for purchase or building of properties.
9. Conclusions
Private renting in Denmark is a marginalised housing sector with low prestige in the political system. This is why it has been sustained in a kind of regulation with strict rent control which has been abolished in other European countries. Moreover, private renting is the only housing tenure in Denmark, which has not received economic support though subsidies or tax reductions. 

As a consequence of rent control there is a surplus demand for private renting in the cities resulting in queues. An advantage of this for private landlords is a steady demand that prevents losses from vacant lettings. Moreover, landlords can pick and choose among house hunters to obtain good and stable tenants who reduce maintenance costs and administration. For the Danish society the disadvantage is that the private rented sector can escape to house people with social problems and immigrants, who instead are referred to social housing where high concentrations of social problems has become a major problem.

Moreover, rent control has reduced the profits, which can be obtained from running private rental properties. A recent study has shown that net yields from private renting are much lower than could be obtained from other businesses. Private renting as an investment has been very much dependent on the development in property values and capital gains, but at the same time returns has been reduced because private renting is the only housing sector that has been subject to capital gains tax.

A paradox is that, in spite of these unfavourable conditions for private renting, the sector for some time increasingly has been dominated by professional landlords. The composition of landlords in Denmark does not deviate markedly from landlords in many other countries and compared to Britain, where there is no rent control, there is a greater share of dwellings owned by professional landlords (business landlords) in Denmark. There could be two explanations for this contradiction. The first is, that returns on Danish properties in the private rented sector have not been so bad – partly because of increases in property values and possibilities to avoid the regulation by investing in renovation of dwellings; the second is that rent control has resulted in a very stable surplus demand for private renting in most of the country, which has diminished economic risks. 

Many landlords in Denmark are so-called sideline investors, who do not let out residential property as their core business, or are other kinds of investors, who have other motives than is expected in economic theory. Many Danish landlords originally have acquired their properties for other reasons than to make an optimal investment. For 20 per cent of landlords it is most important to control the use of the property – either because they want to live there, have business premises or to make housing available for family or for other specific groups. One third of all landlords have this as one of the three most important motives and it concerns more than half of all lettings. Other landlords have bought because they want occupation with building activities or to make a return by investing in this. Moreover, eight per cent have inherited the property or obtained it by accident in other ways.

There are considerable differences in incomes, expenses and returns on properties owned by different types of landlords. Sideline investors – and especially user landlords – in general have properties of much lower value and with much lower rental incomes than business landlords. The greatest differences, however, appear when looking at the expenses on the properties, where sideline investors and users have much lower expenditure for both administration and maintenance. This can partly be explained by more do-it-yourself work, but also is a sign of defective administration and insufficient maintenance. Moreover, business landlords invest much more in improvements of the properties, which to some extent can be explained by the system of rent control. In the end, however, business landlords until 2008 have obtained a much higher total return from running their properties than sideline investors and users. This was not obtained by a higher running surplus from their properties, but by larger capital gains.

The future of the private rental sector in Denmark is uncertain. There are no signs of a change in policies concerning regulation and support to the sector. The basis for investments in the sector, capital gains, has been reversed to losses. Some investors, especially banks and pension funds, have attempted to get rid of their properties. For some landlords the solution has been to try to sell the properties to sitting tenants as co-operatives. It must be expected that the sector will be further diminished in years to come.
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